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Abstract
In Western countries, the distribution of relative incomes within marriages tends to 
be skewed in a remarkable way. Husbands usually do not only earn more than their 
female partners, but there is also a striking discontinuity in their relative contribu‑
tions to the household income at the 50/50 point: many wives contribute just a bit 
less than or as much as their husbands, but few contribute more. This ‘cliff’ has been 
interpreted as evidence that men and women avoid situations where a wife would 
earn more than her husband, since this would go against traditional gender norms. 
In this paper, we use a simulation approach to model marriage markets and demon‑
strate that a cliff in the relative income distribution can also emerge without such 
avoidance. We feed our simulations with income data from 27 European countries. 
Results show that a cliff can emerge from inequalities in men’s and women’s average 
incomes, even if they do not attach special meaning to a situation in which a wife 
earns more than her husband.
Keywords Marriage markets · Income · Gender norms · Gender inequality · 
Simulation modelling
1 Introduction
Women’s labour market opportunities have improved dramatically since the mid 
of the twentieth century. Starting in the 1960s, women have entered higher educa‑
tion in ever greater numbers and nowadays they often outperform men in terms of 
enrolment and success in tertiary education (Blossfeld and Buchholz 2009; DiPrete 
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and Buchmann 2013; Van Bavel et  al. 2018). This was paralleled by an increase 
in female labour force participation and an influx of women into previously male‑
dominated occupations of high status (Baxter et al. 2005; Cha 2013; Goldin 2014; 
Ruggles 2015). Because of these changes, some scholars have expected marriages to 
become increasingly gender egalitarian, meaning that spouses would become more 
and more similar in their labour force participation and contributions to the eco‑
nomic well‑being of their families (e.g., Jalovaara 2012; Nock 2001; Oppenheimer 
1988; Torr 2011).
There is evidence that the economic roles that men and women play within their 
families have indeed become more similar over time (Blossfeld and Buchholz 2009; 
Goldscheider et al. 2015; Sweeney and Cancian 2004; Torr 2011). However, marked 
gender differences still exist in many areas of life (Bailey and DiPrete 2016; England 
2010; Esping‑Andersen 2009; Goldin 2014; Ridgeway 2011), also when it comes 
to the financial contributions that men and women make to their families (Bertrand 
et al. 2015; Brennan et al. 2001; Klesment and Van Bavel 2017; Rogers and DeBoer 
2001; Van Bavel and Klesment 2017). Across households, men not only provide a 
larger share of the household income, but there often is also a remarkable disconti‑
nuity at the 50/50 point.
Figure  1 illustrates this based on data from the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU‑SILC). The selected sample contains unions 
(living in marriage or unmarried cohabitation) among people age 25–45 years in 27 
European countries, observed in 2007 and 2011.1 The figure plots the distribution of 
couples according to the share of the household income that the woman contributes 
(see detailed data description below). As can be seen from Fig. 1, in most countries, 
the relative income distribution steeply increases from the point where the woman 
contributes nothing to the household income, up to the point where she contributes 
close to 50%. After this point, there typically is a sharp drop and there are much 
fewer unions in which the woman contributes more than the man.
One interpretation in the literature holds that this ‘cliff’ in the relative income dis‑
tribution results from persistent gender norms that favour the traditional male bread‑
winner/female homemaker model. More specifically, the fact that there is a discon‑
tinuity at the 50/50 point may indicate a social norm that ‘a man should earn more 
than his wife’ (Bertrand et al. 2015, p. 612).
The observed discontinuity in the distribution of relative incomes within house‑
holds would be consistent with a norm that favours male superiority in income, if 
such a norm existed. However, in this paper, we argue that such a norm is not nec‑
essary to generate a discontinuity. Instead, we suggest that a cliff may emerge even 
if both men and women prefer partners with high income over partners with low 
income, if we consider that even in the most gender egalitarian societies women’s 
average income is lower than men’s.
1 Unmarried cohabitation has been on the rise across Europe in recent years and has attained a status 
similar to marriage in some countries (Hiekel et al. 2014). We thus include both union types in our analy‑
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Our argument is based on the following intuition. If people strive for high‑
income partners, men who rank high in the male income distribution will be in the 
best position to compete for women who rank high in the female income distribu‑
tion, vice versa. Some men may therefore form unions with similar‑income part‑
ners, but because women’s average income is lower, many men will face a shortage 
Fig. 1  Shares that women contribute to household income in 27 countries. Note: The grey vertical line 
indicates the point where the share of the household income that the woman provides is .5. The number 
in the upper left/right corner of each panel shows the share of couples in which the woman contributes 
nothing to the household income. Source: Pooled data from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the cross‑sec‑
tional versions of EU‑SILC
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of partners with similar or even higher income. Unless they are willing to remain 
single, these men will have to form unions with women who earn less than they 
do. Women, by contrast, will have to ‘settle’ less often for a lower‑income partner. 
These differences in men’s and women’s marriage market opportunities are likely to 
not only create a right skew in the distribution of women’s contribution to household 
income, but also a discontinuity close to the 50/50 point. This occurs even if people 
are not more aversive of a situation in which the wife out‑earns her husband than of 
a situation in which he out‑earns her.
We demonstrate the logical consistency and empirical plausibility of our argu‑
ment with a simulation study in which we compare the outcomes of a simple mar‑
riage market model with the observed distributions of relative income in the 27 
countries shown in Fig. 1. The model assumes that men and women strive for a high 
joint income in the unions that they form, while using their own income as a point of 
reference for determining the minimum income they expect in a partner. However, 
they do not evaluate a situation in which a wife out‑earns her husband any differ‑
ently from a situation in which he out‑earns her. Our results show that partner choice 
based on this preference tends to generate a right skew in the distribution of relative 
incomes within households and, most importantly, a discontinuity at the 50/50 point.
In what follows, we present the model in some detail, first providing some theo‑
retical background, then describing the algorithm that we employ in modelling the 
partner search process and discussing the empirical data that we use to create plau‑
sible marriage markets. We then submit the model to systematic simulation experi‑
ments, present our results, and close with discussing the implications that our find‑
ings have for current research practice and future research. We have implemented 
the model in the simulation modelling environment NetLogo (Wilensky 1999). The 
code can be obtained from [https ://www.comse s.net/codeb ases/4e97f a4a‑db5b‑
4cff‑acea‑53142 01af5 ce/], together with a more technical model description and all 
scripts that are necessary to replicate our results.
2  Modelling Marriage Markets
2.1  Background
Observed heterosexual marriage patterns are commonly assumed to derive from 
two‑sided partner search in a marriage market (Schwartz 2013; Willekens 2010). 
This notion holds that both men and women are searching for a spouse among the 
available alternatives of the opposite sex. Their search is guided by a set of pref‑
erences for the characteristics that their partner should have, but the realization of 
these preferences is constrained by the composition of the marriage market. If there 
is a shortage of alternatives with the desired characteristics, the opportunities to find 
the ‘ideal’ mate are limited, and people somehow need to adjust to this reality. These 
adjustments can take different forms, such as widening and prolonging search, set‑
tling for a partner who is less than ideal, or even foregoing marriage altogether 
(England and Farkas 1986; Oppenheimer 1988).
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Past research suggests that men and women somewhat differ in the character‑
istics they prefer in a partner, so that women tend to place more emphasis on the 
economic prospects and status of potential partners than men (Buss 1989; Buss 
et  al. 1990). Sociological explanations of this difference suggest that it reflects 
traditional differences in women’s and men’s roles in society (Eagly et al. 2009). 
In the past, women’s role was traditionally located in the home, and even if they 
worked, they tended to be overrepresented in low‑paying occupations. This made 
their economic well‑being largely dependent on the income of their husbands, 
which explains why they used to put greater emphasis on income in their part‑
ners than men. This difference was also reflected in societal gender norms, that 
held that a man should be the main provider for his family. A situation in which a 
husband was out‑earned by his wife was therefore potentially threatening for his 
male gender identity (Bertrand et  al. 2015; Schwartz and Han 2014). Yet, with 
the increasing convergence in men’s and women’s economic roles that has taken 
place since the mid of the twentieth century, this situation has changed, particu‑
larly in the Western world. That is, men’s and women’s partner preferences have 
become more similar (Zentner and Eagly 2015; Zentner and Mitura 2012) and 
people’s aversiveness to not complying with the traditional male breadwinner 
family model has decreased (Meeussen et al. 2018).
While there are still differences in men’s and women’s partner preferences, and 
while traditional gender norms may persist in some countries and some parts of the 
population, our goal here is to conduct a ‘what‑if’ experiment of the following type: 
What if men’s and women’s partner preferences were the same and there was no 
norm that holds that a husband should earn more than his wife? In such a situation, 
would the existing income differences between them be enough to generate a cliff in 
the relative income distribution as shown in Fig. 1? Hence, from here on we assume 
that men and women put the same emphasis on the income of potential partners, 
and search for a partner with high income, without attaching special meaning to a 
situation in which the woman out‑earns her partner. Next to this, we need to make 
some additional assumptions as to how people go about their search for a partner, to 
conduct our experiment.
One of the most important features of the partner search process is the fact that 
the information that people have about the available alternatives is usually incom‑
plete. This creates the problem of trading off the utility from marrying one of the 
currently available alternatives against the utility from possibly finding somebody 
even more attractive in the future, net of the costs that prolonged search creates. 
Perfectly rational actors with unlimited cognitive capabilities can solve this problem 
by calculating their optimal reservation quality, which defines the minimal quality 
they should strive for in the characteristics of their partner to balance their expected 
search costs, given the available information about the composition of the marriage 
market. They should stop their search when they find a partner whose character‑
istics are equal to or exceed this quality (Batabyal 2009; Keeley 1977; Mortensen 
1988). Yet, as Todd and colleagues (Todd 1997; Todd et al. 2005, 2013; Todd and 
Miller 1999) have highlighted, the calculations that are necessary for this are often 
too complex to be applied by the average person in real life. Instead, people tend to 
apply decision heuristics that are much simpler but still yield satisfactory outcomes.
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One heuristic that has received much attention in earlier research is using the 
quality of one’s own characteristics as a point of reference for selecting a partner 
(e.g., Kenrick et  al. 1993; Kirkpatrick and Ellis 2001, 2006; Penke et  al. 2007; 
Regan 1998; Skopek et al. 2011; Sloman and Sloman 1988; Todd et al. 2007, 2013). 
This heuristic tends to be efficient, because people who have high‑quality charac‑
teristics are in high demand and have good chances of attracting partners who also 
have high‑quality characteristics. They can therefore afford to set their aspirations 
high and still find a partner with reasonable search effort. People with characteristics 
that are in lower demand, by contrast, are likely to experience more difficulties in 
attracting partners with high‑quality characteristics. They therefore often need to set 
their aspirations lower, to avoid engaging in excessive search efforts that do not nec‑
essarily lead to marriage (Penke et al. 2007).
As Kalmijn (1998) highlighted, socioeconomic resources are among most the 
important characteristics that people consider in potential partners. The reason is 
that ‘[e]conomic well‑being is shared by the family members […]. As a result, the 
income and status of one spouse contribute to the income and status of the other by 
raising the income and status of the family’ (Kalmijn 1998, p. 399). If we assume 
that high income is indeed an important characteristic in partnering decisions for 
both men and women, the above heuristic implies that people should strive for part‑
ners who earn at least as much as, or more than, they do. They should be more reluc‑
tant to partner with somebody who earns less. In this way, they minimize the risk of 
settling for a partner whose income is too low, considering their own attractiveness 
on the marriage market.
2.2  The Model
Our model implements the principles discussed in the previous section in the follow‑
ing way. First, we assume that income is the only characteristic that people consider 
in their partnering decisions and that both men and women strive for partners with 
high income. Second, we assume that people’s information about the composition of 
the marriage market (i.e., about the incomes of the available opposite‑sex members) 
is incomplete. They therefore must sample the available alternatives one‑by‑one to 
find a partner. This sampling takes the form of random meetings with opposite‑sex 
members, during which they learn about each other’s income. Third, to avoid set‑
tling for a partner ‘too early’, they engage in a prolonged courtship period before 
fully committing to any of the available alternatives. Courtship is here represented 
by dates that after some time may turn into marriage. During the courtship period, 
people continue sampling from the available alternatives, and they may leave their 
current partner when they meet a person whose income is higher than that of their 
current partner and who is also willing to accept them as a partner (see Simão and 
Todd 2002 for a similar approach to modelling partner search).
Furthermore, and most importantly, we assume that for people who are dating 
somebody, their decision to stop their search and settle for their current partner is 
guided by their income relatively to that of their partner, as well as by the time they 
have been looking for a better alternative without success. In more detail, we assume 
717
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that people are more likely to settle for a partner who earns at least as much as they 
do, than they are to settle for a partner who earns less than they do. Yet, they become 
increasingly willing to settle for any partner, the longer they have already been look‑
ing for a better alternative without success. When two dating individuals both decide 
to stop their search and settle for their current partner, they get married and are per‑
manently removed from the marriage market.
More technically, the model is a two‑sex model that consists of a closed popu‑
lation of male and female individuals, which are indexed by i.2 Next to their gen‑
der (gi), individuals can be described by their annual income (yi) and their relation‑
ship status (ri). Income is fixed and assigned probabilistically at the beginning of a 
given simulation run, based on the empirically observed income distributions that 
we describe in the next section. Individuals’ relationship status can take the states 
‘single’, ‘dating’, or ‘married’, and this state can change over the course of a simula‑
tion run.
Each simulation proceeds in discrete time steps, index by t. In each time step, 
people’s search for a partner takes the form of random meetings with opposite‑sex 
members. The model assumes that single individuals are always looking for a part‑
ner and therefore are always available for meeting opposite‑sex members. By con‑
trast, individuals who are currently dating are only available for meetings if they 
have not stopped their search yet (see details below). Married individuals are not on 
the marriage market and therefore do not take part in meetings.
Whenever two individuals meet, they need to decide whether they want to start 
dating each other and leave potential current partners for this. Income is pivotal in 
these decisions. Single individuals are always willing to date the person they have 
just met, regardless of their income.3 Yet, those who are already dating somebody 
else are only willing to leave their current partner and start dating the person they 
have just met, when the income of this alternative is higher than the income of their 
current partner. Two individuals actually start dating if they are both willing to do 
so. Hence, even if a given individual i is willing to date j, this will not happen unless 
j is also willing to date i.
As indicated above, individuals who are dating somebody might decide to stop 
their search and settle for their current partner. These decisions are made probabil‑
istically at the beginning of each time step. The probability that a given dating indi‑
vidual i will cease his/her search depends on his/her partner’s income relatively to 
i’s and on the time that i has spent already looking for a better alternative without 
success. Formally, the baseline probability that i is willing to stop searching and set‑
tle for his/her partner j is defined as
2 The term ‘two‑sex model’ highlights that the model considers the marriage decision of both men and 
women simultaneously. This is in contrast to ‘one‑sex models’, in which only the marriage decisions of 
men or women are modelled (cf. Willekens 2010).
3 A simplifying assumption is here that individuals prefer having a partner over being single, regardless 
of income of their partner.
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where sj is the share that i’s current partner j would contribute to the overall house‑
hold income if they would get married (calculated as sj = yj/(yj + yi)), and the param‑
eter m limits the maximal value of PA . Setting m < 1 ensures that even individuals 
who have already found a partner who earns much more than they do invest at least 
some effort in finding a partner with even more income. Furthermore, we set the 
lower limit of PA to 0.05, so that even individuals who do not contribute anything 
to the household income (i.e., who have no income) have some chance of getting 
married (sj is set to .5 if both partners have no income). The parameter α governs 
how much individuals differentiate between potential spouses who earn less than 
they do and spouses who earn at least as much as they do. Figure 2 illustrates this 
for different α‑values, at all possible values of sj, with m = .8. As the figure shows, 
as α becomes larger, the baseline probability that i is willing to cease his/her search 
is much lower when j earns less than i (i.e., when sj − 0.5 < 0) than when j earns as 
much as, or more than, i (i.e., when sj − 0.5 ≥ 0).
Even though our artificial individuals are aversive of accepting somebody who 
makes less than they do as partner, this aversion decreases when they fail to find 
a better alternative who is also willing to accept them as a partner. We implement 
this by weighting PA by the number of time steps that the focal individual i has 






Fig. 2  Baseline probability that individual i is willing to settle for his/her partner j, contingent on how 
much the share of the household income that j would contribute deviates from .5 (sj −  .5) at different 
levels of α 
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Equation  (2) holds that individual i becomes increasingly willing to settle for 
their current partner, the longer he/she has been searching for an alternative already 
(i.e., the larger ci,t becomes). Thus, individuals are striving for high‑income part‑
ners and try to attain their goal by ‘trading up’ their current dates whenever they 
get the opportunity to do so. Yet, if they fail to find somebody better for some time, 
they become increasingly likely to settle for their current partner. This is particularly 
likely for those whose partners earn at least as much as they do.
Individuals who have stopped their search and settled for their partners become 
willing to marry them. They are therefore not available for meetings with opposite‑
sex members anymore. This does not mean that individual i automatically gets mar‑
ried the moment he/she ceases his/her search. Marriage happens only when his/her 
partner j also decides to stop his/her search. Before this happens, j may continue to 
meet opposite‑sex members, and this may lead j to break up with i, if j encounters 
somebody who earns more than i and is also willing to date j. If this happens, i 
becomes single again and therefore is available for meeting with opposite‑sex mem‑
bers again. However, the moment j also stops searching and settles for i, the two get 
married and are permanently removed from the marriage market.
To summarize, the processes that take place in each time step are as follows:
(1) Determine for each man and woman whether they are currently searching a 
partner. Single individuals are always searching for a partner, but people who are 
currently dating may cease their search (based on the probabilities determined by 
Eqs. (1) and (2)). People who have ceased their search will remain in this state 
either (a) until the person they are dating also ceases their search or (b) until they 
lose the person they were dating to somebody else.
(2) For all dates in which both individuals have ceased their search, let the involved 
individuals get married and remove them from the marriage market.
(3) Each man who is looking for a partner is randomly paired with one woman who 
is also looking for a partner. At this moment, both need to decide whether they 
want to start dating the person they have just met. For people who are currently 
single, this is always the case. For people who are already dating somebody else, 
this is the case if the income of the person they have just met is higher than the 
income of their current date. When both want to date, they leave possible current 
partners and actually start dating.
(4) Among all people who are dating, increase the number of time steps they are 
already looking for a better alternative by one.
These steps are iterated until all men and women have married.
2.3  Empirical data
Similar to Klesment and Van Bavel (Klesment and Van Bavel 2017; Van Bavel and 
Klesment 2017), we used data from the 2007 and 2011 rounds of the EU‑SILC. 
(2)PB,t = 1 − e−(PAci,t).
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The EU‑SILC is an annual cross‑national survey that started with 15 participating 
countries in 2004. By 2007/2011, this number had increased to 31/32 countries, 
respectively. The survey employs a rotating panel, in which each subsequent wave 
replaces part of the sample, so that the entire sample is renewed every four years. 
We used the cross‑sectional version of the survey, and the income reference years 
for the 2007/2011 waves are the years 2006/2010, respectively. For comparability, 
we focused on the same 27 countries as Klesment and Van Bavel (Klesment and Van 
Bavel 2017; Van Bavel and Klesment 2017). We weighted the data with the sam‑
pling weights that are provided with the EU‑SILC and used the resulting data in two 
parts of our study.
First, we used the data for calculating the distributions of relative income 
shown in Fig. 1, which are the target of our simulation experiments. In doing so, 
we applied similar rules for case selection as Klesment and Van Bavel (2017). 
That is, we selected women who were living with a partner at the time of the 
survey (either in marriage or in unmarried cohabitation), who were between 25 
and 45 years old, and whose partner was in the same age range.4 For calculating 
the share of the couple’s joint household income that the woman provides (sf), 
we focused on both partner’s annual gross income from paid employment and 
self‑employment, only including couples in which at least one partner had posi‑
tive income. This share was calculated as sf = yf/(yf + ym), where yf and ym refer to 
the woman’s and her partner’s income, respectively. Table  1 (Sample A) shows 
the number of unions that were included in the analysis, and Fig. 1 above shows 
the distributions of relative income within the selected unions. Note that women 
are more likely than men to have no income at all. There was thus a large share 
of couples in which the woman contributed nothing to the household income. To 
avoid that this large share affects the scaling of the figures when showing the rela‑
tive income distributions across countries, we followed Klesment and Van Bavel 
(2017) and opted for displaying the share of this unions type as a number in the 
upper left/right corner of Fig. 1.
Second, we used the EU‑SILC data for initializing the marriage markets in 
our simulation experiments in terms of the income distributions in each of the 
27 countries that we considered. For this, we included all individuals between 25 
and 45 years of age, regardless of their union status at the time of the survey (i.e., 
including individuals who were single, widowed, separated, married, or living in 
unmarried cohabitation). With this approach, we take the observed incomes of men 
and women as given and explore what the resulting relative income distributions 
4 Klesment and Van Bavel (2017) only selected women conditional on their own age, regardless of their 
partner’s age. By contrast, we constrained the ages of both men and women for the following reason. In 
our simulations, we used the EU‑SILC data for separately initializing the income distributions among 
male and female agents. If for this we would have placed an age constraint on women, but not on men, 
this would have led to a situation in which income differences between the sexes may partially result 
from differences in the age distributions in the two samples. To avoid this, we placed the same age con‑
straints on both men and women when generating the input data. As a consequence, we also needed to 
impose age constraints on both sexes when exploring the empirically observed distributions of relative 
income within unions. Otherwise, the results of our simulation experiments would be based on very dif‑
ferent samples than the result of our empirical analysis.
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would look like if members of both sexes would select their partners based on these 
incomes. Table 1 (Sample B) shows the case numbers per gender that we obtained 
and Fig. 3 shows the resulting income distributions.5 Across all 27 countries, wom‑
en’s average income was lower than men’s, and women’s income distribution tended 
to be heavier on the left‑hand side than men’s. This means that typically there were 
more women than men who earned comparatively little. At the same time, there 
were often many more men than women in the highest income categories.
Table 1  Number of cases per 
country by sample




Austria 2573 4591 4152
Belgium 2436 4278 4069
Bulgaria 1947 3712 3750
Cyprus 1649 3201 2668
Czech Republic 3534 6005 5869
Denmark 2421 3680 3214
Estonia 2052 3584 3400
Finland 4095 6050 6100
France 4354 7032 6621
Germany 4448 8274 6960
Greece 1074 2149 2061
Hungary 3973 7308 6905
Iceland 1541 2362 2317
Italy 7151 14,916 14,051
Latvia 1601 3429 3036
Lithuania 1590 2949 2664
Luxembourg 2634 4176 3990
Netherlands 4896 7292 6730
Norway 2389 3704 3566
Poland 5900 10,090 9370
Portugal 1785 3351 3190
Romania 3015 5148 5051
Slovakia 2256 4353 4179
Slovenia 4195 8412 8503
Spain 5453 10,459 9827
Sweden 2982 4586 4370
United Kingdom 3087 5597 4901
5 Compared to Fig. 3, we used the observed real incomes in the simulations, without aggregating them 
into larger income groups.
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2.4  Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we assumed a population of 1000 men and 1000 women. These 
individuals were assigned their income probabilistically based on the country‑ and 
gender‑specific income data that we obtained from the EU‑SILC. To implement 
the notion that people use their own income as a point of reference when select‑
ing a partner, we set α to 30, so that they strongly differentiated in their marriage 
Fig. 3  Comparison of women’s and men’s incomes across 27 countries. Note: Income is measured in 
national currencies. The vertical lines show the average incomes of men and women. Source: Pooled data 
from the 2007 and 2011 waves of the cross‑sectional versions of EU‑SILC
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decisions between those opposite‑sex members who earn less than they do and those 
who earn as much as, or more than, they do. To assess how sensitive our results are 
to this assumption, we conducted an additional simulation experiment in which we 
explored the behaviour of the model for smaller α‑values (i.e., α = 5, α = 10, α = 15, 
α = 20, and α = 25). For this, we focused on four countries that showed a large cliff, 
both in the empirical data and in the outcomes of our main simulation experiment 
(Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Across simulation runs, we 
assumed that the maximum baseline probability for accepting somebody for mar‑
riage was 0.8 (i.e., m = 0.8). As indicated above, the lower limit of this probability 
was 0.05.
The outcome that we are interested in is the share of the income that the female 
members of our artificial unions contribute to the overall household income. As for 
the empirical data, we calculated this share as sf = yf/(yf + ym), where yf and ym are 
the individual incomes of the female and male partner, respectively.
Given the stochastic nature of the simulation process, we conducted 50 simula‑
tion runs per country and condition and averaged the outcomes across runs.
3  Results
Figure 4 shows the distributions of relative income that we obtained from our main 
simulation experiment and compares them with the distributions observed in the 
empirical data. As in Fig.  1, we show the share of couples in which the woman 
contributes nothing to the total household income in the upper left/right corner, 
distinguishing the empirical and the simulation data with ‘E’ and ‘S’, respectively. 
On average, it took about 36 time steps (SD = 4.3) for everybody to get married (at 
which point a given simulation run stopped).
The most striking, and most important, result that Fig. 4 illustrates is that in many 
of the countries that we consider here, the simulation model generated a cliff in 
the relative income distribution. This cliff was often similar to, but frequently was 
even stronger than, the cliff in the empirical data. The example of Sweden illustrates 
this nicely. In the empirical data, the last category before the 50/50 demarcation 
line (i.e., the category in which women earn about as much as men) contains about 
12% of all couples, whereas the first category immediately after this line contains 
only 8% of all couples. In the simulation data, by contrast, these categories contain 
about 16% and 10% of all couples, respectively. Hence, the drop that the simulation 
model generates is two percentage points larger than the drop that we observed in 
the empirical data.
A second striking feature of the simulated distributions is that they tend to closely 
trace the empirical distributions at the low and high ends of the relative income dis‑
tribution. That is, while the model tends to generate more couples with roughly sim‑
ilar income than observed empirically, it quite accurately captures the shares of cou‑
ples in which women contribute very little or very much to the household income. 
This also applies to the most extreme categories, in which women contribute noth‑
ing to the household income, or in which their income accounts for almost the entire 
household income. The case of Belgium illustrates this well. In the EU‑SILC data, 
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women have no income in about 15% of all couples, whereas this value is 13% in 
the simulation results. Similarly, in both the empirical data and the simulation data, 
couples in which women’s income accounts for almost the entire household income 
make for about 3% of all couples.
Fig. 4  Comparison of the relative income distributions observed in the EU‑SILC data with those gen‑
erated by the simulation model. Note: The grey vertical line indicates the point where the share of the 
household income that the woman provides is .5. The numbers in the upper left/right corner of each 
panel show the shares of couples in which the woman contributes nothing to the household income. 
Source: The simulation results are based on the main simulation experiment. The empirical data are the 
same as for Fig. 1
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In some countries, there are notable deviations from these general patterns. First, 
in the empirical distributions, the couple shares steeply increase in most countries 
from the point where women earn nothing, to the point where they earn almost as 
much as their partners. The only exceptions from this are Austria and Germany, 
where there are almost constant shares of couples in which the woman earns less 
than her partner, regardless of her/his exact income. The simulation model does not 
capture this well. Furthermore, the model does not generate a cliff in all countries. 
In particular, in Lithuania and Slovenia, the relative income distribution that the 
model generates is rather symmetric around the 50/50 demarcation line. Notably, in 
these countries, there also is no clear discontinuity at the 50/50 demarcation line in 
the empirical data.
To what extent do our results depend on the assumption that men and women use 
their own income as a point of reference when selecting a partner? The results of 
Fig. 5  Comparison of the relative income distributions that the simulation model generates, contingent 
on the parameter α. Note: The grey vertical line indicates the point where the share of the household 
income that the woman provides is .5. Source: The simulation results are based on the sensitivity simula‑
tion experiment
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our sensitivity analysis shown in Fig. 5 enable us to answer this question. Remem‑
ber that the parameter α governs how strongly individuals discriminate between 
potential partners who earn less than they do, and potential partners who earn as 
much as, or more than, they do. Higher α‑values imply stronger discrimination. As 
can be seen in Fig. 5, the cliff in the relative income distribution is the largest for 
the highest value of α (α = 30, as we have used in our main experiment). At lower 
α‑values, the cliff becomes smaller, and at the lowest α‑value, the distributions are 
rather smooth around the 50/50 demarcation line.6 Hence, for the cliff to emerge, it 
is crucial that individuals use their own income as a point of reference when evaluat‑
ing potential partners.
One remarkable feature of the results shown in Fig. 5 is that as the discontinu‑
ity becomes weaker with deceasing α‑values, the peak of the distribution shifts to 
the left, so that there often is a large share of couples in which women’s income 
accounts for about 30–40% of the household income. This provides some insights 
into precisely how the partnering preferences that we assume here generate the out‑
comes observed in the main simulation experiment (shown in Fig. 4). The fact that 
both men and women prefer partners with high income, combined with the fact that 
women’s average incomes are lower than men’s, leads the relative income distri‑
butions to become right‑skewed. This means that there are more unions in which 
women earn considerably less than their partners than there are unions in which they 
earn more. At the same time, the more strongly members of both genders use their 
income as a point of reference for selecting partners, the more unions form in which 
women earn almost as much as their partners, thereby contributing to the cliff at the 
50/50 demarcation line. The reason for this is that in this situation, both men and 
women are aversive of a situation in which their partner makes less than they do. 
For women it is easier to avoid such a situation, given that men’s average income is 
higher.
4  Discussion and Conclusion
The distribution of the relative contributions of husbands and wives to their joint 
income shows a remarkable discontinuity at the 50% line: while the number of cou‑
ples where the wife contributes almost 50% of the household income tends to be 
quite high in many countries, the number of couples where the wife earns just more 
than 50% is much lower. It has been suggested that this discontinuity reflects a male 
breadwinner norm, and more specifically a norm that a man should earn more than 
his wife. However, in this paper, we have demonstrated that the observed discontinu‑
ity in the relative earnings distribution need not reflect such a norm.
We hypothesized that the discontinuity to the disadvantage of women that 
has been observed empirically in Western countries might emerge even if peo‑
ple would not attach special meaning to a situation in which a wife out‑earns 
her husband and simply value high income in their partners. The reason for 
6 For legibility, we have omitted the share of couples in which women have zero income from the figure.
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this expectation is that there are differences in the average incomes of men and 
women, and these differences limit men’s opportunities to find partners who earn 
as much as, or more than, they do, whereas this is easier for women. We have 
explored the logical consistency and empirical plausibly of our argument with 
a simple simulation model. The results of our simulation experiments show that 
this model can generate a discontinuity in the relative income distribution to the 
disadvantage of women, without the need to assume that there is a norm accord‑
ing to which a man should earn more than his wife. In fact, our results suggest 
that a discontinuity is likely to emerge even if women and men alike prefer part‑
ners with similar or higher income over partners with lower income.
Our work contributes to an emerging body of literature that seeks to shed more 
light on the mechanisms that might underlie the income cliff, which was first 
reported for the US by Bertrand et al (2015) (e.g., Binder and Lam 2019; Hederos 
and Stenberg 2019; Roth and Slotwinski 2018; Sprengholz et al. 2019; Zinovyeva 
and Tverdostup 2018). In particular, using a similar analytical approach as we did, 
Binder and Lam (2019) found for the US that if men and women were matched 
based on their ranks in the respective gender‑specific income distribution, exist‑
ing income differences between the sexes would lead to a right skew (but not nec‑
essarily a cliff) in the relative income distribution, even in the absence of a male 
breadwinner norm. The results that we have presented here for a larger selec‑
tion of 27 European countries support the notion that existing income differences 
between men and women can lead to a skew in the relative income distribution to 
the disadvantage of women. Additionally, we showed that these differences can 
also create a notable cliff at the 50/50 demarcation line, if both men and women 
strive for partners whose income is at least as high as their own.
The simulation model that we have presented here is a minimal model that 
focuses on the mechanism that we were interested in. As such, it abstracts from 
many additional processes that may affect marriage patterns in real life. For 
example, one aspect that we have neglected is that peoples’ incomes might be 
endogenous to the marriage process. There is evidence that especially in more 
traditional gender‑norm contexts, both men and women tend to adjust their labour 
market behaviour as a result of marriage and the anticipation of children within 
their newly formed families. Women in particular tend to reduce their working 
hours to take care of their children (Sanchez and Thomson 1997). This fact may 
explain some of the deviations that we observed between the empirical data and 
our simulation results.
To illustrate this, it helps considering the example of Germany, where our model 
generated considerably fewer couples in which the woman contributes relatively 
little to the household income than empirically observed. One factor that arguably 
contributes to this deviation is the German tax‑code. In Germany, spouses’ tax bur‑
dens are interdependent, so that in marriages in which one partner earns less than 
the other, there is a financial incentive for the lower earning partner to reduce their 
participation in the labour force and to reduce their income even further. Given that 
women’s earning potential tends to be lower than men’s, this usually means that 
women reduce their working hours and therefore contribute relatively little to the 
household income (cf. Aboim 2010; Sprengholz et al. 2019). Our model abstracts 
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from such intra‑couple income adjustments and therefore fails to match the empiri‑
cal data in Germany.
Furthermore, we cannot rule out that the income distributions that we have used 
for initializing our simulation model partly result from gender norms other than a 
norm that a man should earn more than his wife. As indicated above, women tend 
to reduce their participation in the labour force more than men upon the birth of 
a child, and this may partly result from a belief that women are better able to take 
care of children (Thompson and Walker 1989). Similarly, men are often perceived 
to be better leaders than women and therefore tend to advance faster through organi‑
zational hierarchies and attain higher salaries (Ridgeway 2011). Still, even if such 
beliefs exist and can explain why there are systematic income differences between 
men and women, the results of our simulation experiments show that an additional 
male breadwinner norm at the couple level is not necessary to explain the income 
inequalities that can been observed within heterosexual unions.
A second factor that we have neglected is other mechanisms that may contribute 
to similarity in partners’ incomes, net of people’s partner preferences. For exam‑
ple, in our simulations, we have focused on national marriage markets, but in real‑
ity, people tend to encounter future partners in more local contexts, such as their 
schools, neighbourhoods, and workplaces. Such contexts are often socially segre‑
gated, and this increases the likelihood that people who meet there are more similar 
in their socioeconomic characteristics than randomly selected members of the over‑
all population would be (Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Mare 1991; Zinovyeva and Tver‑
dostup 2018). This is likely to increase the similarity in income that can be observed 
within couples, net of any specific partner preferences. Future research might extend 
our work to incorporate such more ‘local’ marriage markets in the simulation pro‑
cess and explore how this affects model outcomes.
A third factor that we have neglected are other characteristics that people may 
consider when selecting a partner, which may be correlated with income. One 
prime characteristic in this regard is educational attainment. Earlier partner market 
research has highlighted that educational attainment is a proxy of people’s cultural 
resources (e.g., their taste in music, political attitudes, etc.), which is one of the most 
important factors in partner selection, next to people’s socioeconomic resources (as 
reflected in income) (Grow et al. 2017; Kalmijn 1998). Both men and women tend 
to prefer partners with similar cultural resources, which leads to high levels of edu‑
cational homogamy across countries (cf. Blossfeld 2009). At the same time, higher 
educational attainment is associated with higher income among both men and 
women, but women tend to earn less than men with the same educational attainment 
(Bobbitt‑Zeher 2007). Thus, to the extent that men and women select educationally 
similar partners, a cliff in the relative income distribution across households might 
emerge as a side‑effect, even if income itself would play no role in the partner selec‑
tion process. Future research might consider this possibility and provide intriguing 
new insights into how much of the cliff might be attributed directly to people’s pref‑
erences for socioeconomic resources in their partners, and how much of it might 
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A fourth factor that we have not considered is that the amount of information that 
people have about the composition of the marriage market might vary. In our model, 
we assumed that people have only minimal information at their disposal and must 
acquire additional information in a sequential–and subjectively costly–manner. This 
creates a difficult trade‑off between settling for one of the available alternatives and 
extending the search, without knowing whether better alternatives will present them‑
selves in the future. Some scholars have argued that new digital tools for partner 
search (such as online dating) have greatly reduced partner search costs, thereby pro‑
viding people with a more accurate image of ‘who is out there’ (at least within the 
confines of the chosen dating platform) (e.g., Hitsch et al. 2010). Arguably, assum‑
ing such a situation of almost perfect information might have affected our results, by 
reducing the number of people who settle for a partner who is ‘below’ what would 
have been possible, given their own attractiveness on the marriage market. We have 
assessed this possibility with a second simulation model, in which we assumed that 
(1) men and women know about the income of all the alternatives on the marriage 
market, and that (2) they can try to date any opposite‑sex member at any point in 
time (with the exception of married individuals and those who have rejected them 
for a date already). The results of this model generated cliffs in the relative income 
distributions across countries that were even more pronounced than those reported 
in this paper. Interestingly, these cliffs occurred already at the point where women 
provide about 40% of the household income, rather than at the 50% point (results 
available upon request from the corresponding author). These additional results sug‑
gest that our main conclusion does not depend on specific assumptions about the 
information that people have at their disposal.
Despite the need for further research, our results have important implications for 
current research practice and for theorizing about the future of gender inequality 
within families. First, several scholars have highlighted that inferring partner pref‑
erences and norms from observed marriage patterns can be an ecological fallacy, 
because very different preferences can lead to very similar marriage patterns (Binder 
and Lam 2019; Grow et  al. 2017; Grow and Van Bavel 2015; Kalick and Hamil‑
ton 1986). Our results add to this body of research and caution against inferring 
preferences and norms from aggregate‑level mating patterns. Note that we have not 
demonstrated the existence or non‑existence of a norm that a husband should earn 
more than his wife. Rather, we have demonstrated that such a norm is not needed to 
explain the relative income cliff. Still, such a norm could be one of several mecha‑
nisms that can generate a cliff in the relative income distribution. It could well exist, 
in at least some parts of the population, in at least some countries, and our results 
suggest that if we want to estimate precisely how much this norm might contribute 
to observed intra‑couples inequalities, we need to take the structure of the marriage 
market in which unions are formed into account.
Second, several scholars have highlighted that the increase in gender equality that 
has occurred in Western countries since the 1960s has weakened or even stalled in 
recent years (e.g., England 2010; Esping‑Andersen 2009). One possible reason is 
that gender norms tend to be deeply entrenched and need time to adjust to structural 
changes, such as changes in women’s economic roles. Some scholars have therefore 
suggested that additional gains in equality may occur in the future, to the extent that 
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traditional gender norms fade and become replaced by more egalitarian alternatives 
(Goldscheider et al. 2015). However, our results suggest that even if people’s part‑
ner preferences would be completely gender egalitarian, women may remain eco‑
nomically disadvantaged within their families, if their average income is lower than 
men’s. Thus, in line with Goldin’s (2014) reasoning, our results suggest that the ‘last 
chapter of the grand gender convergence’ will not only require ideational change, 
but also institutional change aimed at reducing the gender pay gap, as this will create 
the structural conditions that are necessary to attain more equality within families.
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